Livestock Producers Should Not Ignore The Food Security Act of 1985 by Schmiesing, Brian H.
South Dakota State University
Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional
Repository and Information Exchange
Economics Commentator Economics
3-5-1986
Livestock Producers Should Not Ignore The Food
Security Act of 1985
Brian H. Schmiesing
South Dakota State University
Follow this and additional works at: http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_comm
Part of the Agricultural and Resource Economics Commons, and the Regional Economics
Commons
This Newsletter is brought to you for free and open access by the Economics at Open PRAIRIE: Open Public Research Access Institutional Repository
and Information Exchange. It has been accepted for inclusion in Economics Commentator by an authorized administrator of Open PRAIRIE: Open
Public Research Access Institutional Repository and Information Exchange. For more information, please contact michael.biondo@sdstate.edu.
Recommended Citation
Schmiesing, Brian H., "Livestock Producers Should Not Ignore The Food Security Act of 1985" (1986). Economics Commentator. Paper
229.
http://openprairie.sdstate.edu/econ_comm/229
—^OPERATIVE EXTENSION SERVICE«9cnviv^C \
Economics Newsletter ''W
Editor: Donald C. Taylor
Economics Department SDSU, Box 5n4A Brookings, SD 57007 Tele: (605) 688-4141
No. 233 March 5, 1986
Livestock Producers Should Not Ignore
The Food Security Act of 1985
Brian H. Schmiesing
Grain Marketing Research
and
Richard C. Shane
Grain Marketing Extension
Livestock producers should consider
the potential to improve their livestock
operation's cash flow by participating
in the 1985 farm program. Even though a
livestock producer may use all the
farm's production in the livestock
operation,, the 1985 farm .program may
represent a method to improve cash flow.
Because of the large divergence between
market prices and government target
prices, deficiency payments could be a
major revenue source for livestock
producers.
In this newsletter, a case study
hog and grain farm is analyzed to
determine whether participation in the
1985 program could potentially improve
the cash flow of the farming operation.
Three price and production scenarios are
analyzed to illustrate whether
participation in the government program
is a correct decision under different
price and production conditions. The
final section in the newsletter includes
a discussion of how corn call options
can be used to protect the livestock
producer from increasing feed costs when
a poor crop results in much higher grain
prices.
Description of Hog & Grain Farm
It is assumed that the farmer buys
feeder pigs during the year and uses the
farm's com and oats production to
finish the hogs to a slaughter weight of
2A0 pounds. Nine bushels of corn and
three bushels of oats are assumed to be
required for the feeder pigs to reach
market weight. The farmer plans to
market 2,500 slaughter hogs during the
year. This implies that the famer must
have 22,500 bushels of corn and 7,500
bushels of oats to finish the hogs. If
the producer does not have sufficient
production, it is assumed that grain
must be purchased at a local elevator at
a price 10 cents higher than the price
being paid for farmer grain deliveries
to the elevator.
The case study farm has 6A0 acres
of which only 600 acres are tillable.
The planned crop acreages are equal to
the base crop acreages for the farm.
For example, if the producer decides not
to participate in the farm program, 300
acres of com will be planted. This 300
acres of corn is exactly equal to the
corn base for the farm.
The planned planting levels for the
farm with and without government
participation are presented in Table lA.
The required setaside including the paid
diversion is 20 percent of the base
acreage for corn and oats. If the
producer participates in the farm
program, only 240 acres of corn and 80
acres of oats will be planted or 80
percent of the base acreage. Because
soybeans and alfalfa do not have a
setaside requirement, the planted
acreages are the same "with" and
"without" the government program.
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For . the analysis, the farm is
assumed to be capable of producing a
"bumper yield," a "base yield," and a
"poor yield." The bxamper yield is 33
percent higher than base yield and the
poor yield is 33 percent lower than the
base yield. To simplify the example,
the base yield is assiimed to be equal to
the yield the ASCS will use to calculate
the deficiency payments for the farm.
With a bumper yield, the producer will
have an actual yield higher than the
yield used to calculate the deficiency
payments. A poor yield is just the
opposite.
Three Different Price Scenarios
It is assumed that all producers
have yield experiences similar to the
case study farm. Everyone has a bumper
crop along with the case study farmer or
everyone has a poor crop right along
with the case study farmer. What does
this imply about market prices for the
grains and alfalfa produced?
Prices and production are inversely
related. Higher production levels imply
lower prices and vice versa. In the
bumper yield scenario, the analysis
assumes market prices will fall below
the support price for corn, oats and
soybeans. During the past year with its
large crop, market prices have fallen
below the support price. Expectations
would be that another bumper would again
cause prices to fall below the support
price. If production is close to the
base yields, the expectation would be
for market prices to be slighly higher
than the support prices. With a poor
crop, the expectation would be for major
price improvement.
The prices used in the analysis are
presented on Table lA. The actual
support prices for South Dakota had not
been announced at the time this analysis
was conducted. The estimates in Table 1
represent our best "guess" based on the
traditional price relationship between
the South Dakota and national support
prices. The market prices used in the
case are directed more towards
demonstrating what the case farm's cash
flow will be at different price levels
than to be forecasts of what prices will
be next year.
The three price scenarios represent
the three situations that the hog
producer could be confronted with: (1)
a situation where a large crop results
in cheap feed at a price even lower than
the loan rate; (2) a situation where an
average crop results in feed costs not
being much different from what currently
exists; and (3) the final situation
where the producer will be short feed
and will have to buy grain at market
prices.
The third .scenario is the worst
case scenario for the livestock producer
because grain prices are assumed to run
up to such a high level that no
deficiency payment would be received.
In fact, given the current government
program, the producer would have to pay
back the advanced deficiency payment
that was received in the spring. In
addition, the producer would have to buy
high priced grain for feed in the cash
market. It is assiimed that the setaside
acreage would produce no additional
revenue to offset higher feed costs: if
the producer does not participate in the
program, this acreage would produce a
crop which can be used in the feeding
operation. This has been one of the
reasons why many livestock producers
have not participated in farm programs
in the past. As will be demonstrated,
the use of call options could offer the
potential to at least partially offset
this disadvantage for the livestock
producer.
The slaughter hog and feeder pig
prices were assumed not to change with
changes in crop yields. This assumption
was made so the analysis would show cash
flow changes related only to the
interaction between crop yields, crop
prices and government program payments.
The feeder pig price was assumed to be
$34.25 and the slaughter hog price was
$39.50.
Total Direct Costs of
. Production for Crops
The analysis concentrated only upon
those costs directly related to the
production of the crops and livestock.
For grains, only those costs that
changed either with the niimber of acres
planted or number of bushels produced
1
were used to calculate total costs.
Examples of such costs would be seed,
fertilizer, fuel, machinery repair and
interest costs on operating capital.
These costs were obtained from the SDSU
extension publication entitled Expected
Production Costs for Major Crops in
South Dakota. The cost figures for the
East Central Area of South Dakota were
used.
The direct costs for grain
production DO NOT include overhead
depreciation for machinery, return to
management, rent on land or an interest
charge on intermediate or long term
assets. The decision to participate in
the farm program is a SHORT-RUN decision
for the farming operation. The decision
must be based on the strategy that will
produce the largest contribution to pay
these overhead costs. This does not
necessarily imply that a specific
producer will be able to generate an
adequate contribution to overhead to
cover all costs associated with the
farming operation.
Because participation in the farm
program reduces the number of acres in
production, the total direct costs of
production are reduced with
participation in the government program
(Table IB). For example, total direct
costs associated with a bumper yield are
$50,005 for non participation and
$43,794 for participation. Total direct
costs for crops not requiring a setaside
are not reduced by government
participation.
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Total direct costs are higher for a
b\imper yield than a poor yield with and
without participation in the govenment
program. Why? A bumper crop will
require additional operating capital,
and have higher total drying and storage
costs. An important point to consider
is that average (per bushel) direct
costs change with the three yield
scenarios.
Average Direct Costs for Crops
Although total direct costs, are the
highest for the bumper yield, average
direct costs for crops are the LOWEST
with a bumper yield. Input costs are
spread over a larger nximber of bushelis
per acre.
A livestock producer might ask the
following question, "What if I have a
poor yield and the rest of the country
has a b\imper crop? Wouldn't I be better
off if I didn't participate in the
program so at least I would not have to
buy the grain?" In a poor crop year,
the producer would have average direct
costs of $1.98 per bushel for corn and
$1.11 per bushel for oats (Table IB).
Even if the producer paid 30 cents over
the market prices expected with a bumper
crop, ($1.60 + $.30 for corn and $.80 +
$.30 for oats as shown in Table 1) this
still would be. a lower price than the
average direct costs of production.
Also, remember that these average direct
costs do not include any depreciation or
land rental charge so the advantage of
buying grain rather than producing grain
is even larger than indicated by, the
reported average direct costs.
Total Direct Costs of Slaughter Hogs
The total direct costs of producing
hogs, excluding grain costs, were
estimated to be $57.00 per head. These
costs include protein supplement, death
loss, utilities, marketing and
miscellaneous operating costs. Again
depreciation and interest on buildings
and equipment, and return to management
were excluded from the direct cost
calculation so that final returns
reflect contributions to pay these
overhead costs. This estimate was based
on the January 31, 1986 "Profit
Projection Report" prepared by John
Morrell & Company.
Feed costs are excluded at this
point because the value of the grain
used as feed will vary depending upon
the crop scenario and whether producers
participate in the farm program. The
cost of feed is NOT what a producer can
produce the grain for but rather the
price at which the grain can be sold or
purchased. In feeding the grain, the
producer is making a decision not to
market the grain directly. The value of
the grain being used in hog production
is the value of the grain if marketed,
not its cost of production.
The hog and grain farmer is really
operating two businesses. The losses in
grain production should be explicitly
recognized rather than hidden by making
feed costs equal to the cost of
producing the grain. The grain
production business must sell grain to
the hog production business at the best
available price for the commodity. The
next section presents an abbreviated
version of the calculations required to
determine whether participation in the
farm program would increase the cash
flow of the case study hog and grain
farm.
Contribution to Overhead
Compared to nonparticipation,
participation in the government program
would provide greater contribution to
overhead in the bumper and base yield
scenarios, but less in the poor yield
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scenario (Table 2). For the bumper
yield scenario the dollar advantage of
the government program was $21,345. It
was $18,737 for the base yield scenario.
In the poor yield scenario the shortfall
was $2,596 dollars for participating in
the government program.
What caused the outcomes above?
Participation in the government program
resulted in higher total revenues for
the operation under all three scenarios.
However, under a poor yield scenario,
participation in the government program
decreased the cash flow of the producer
because increased feed costs were
incurred when grain was purchased.
Without participation, the farm would
have exactly enough corn and oats to
feed the slaughter hogs assuming base
yields. With a poor yield, the farm
would have to purchase 7,500 bushels of
com and 2,500 bushels of oats from the
elevator. With government
participation, the deficit would be
4,500 bushels of corn and 1,500 bushels
of oats With a base yield, and 10,500
bushels of com and 3,500 bushels of
oats with a poor yield.
Higher grain prices placed the
livestock operation in a cost squeeze
because the market value of the produced
and purchased feed is increased. The
problem IS NOT the short crop, but
rather the price of the feed input. The
issue is controlling the market value of
the feed input—not managing the farming
operation to insure that an adequate
feed supply is available. Until this
year producers have lacked the necessary
marketing tool to manage this price
problem. The Chicago Board of Trade
corn call options, initiated in 1985,
could be used to solve the above
problem.
Buying a Call Option
A call option gives the purchaser
the right to buy a specified futures
contract at a predetermined price called
2 strike price. The purchase price of
the call option is the option premium.
The Chicago Board of Trade corn options
are based on 5,000 bushels futures
contract. The fundamental mle of input
procurement is "buy cheap." If the
strike price of the call option is lower
- >-t:han the price in the futures market,
the call option has economic value. The
ovmer of the option can exercise the
option and buy the futures contract at
the strike price which is lower than the
futures market price or offset the
option contract and obtain its value by
collecting its now higher premivun. If
the strike price is higher than the
futures market price, the owner of the
option will not exercise the option
because the "cheapest" market for the
futures contract is the futures market
price. Therefore, the call option
premium will be zero at expiration..
If futures market prices increase,
call option premiums increase and vice
versa. When a livestock producer buys a
corn call option, he is establishing a
ceiling price for his feed input. The
call's strike price is the highest price
that the owner of the call has to pay
for a specific futures contract. By
adjusting for the local basis, the
producer indirectly establishes a
ceiling price for the feed inputs.
Increases in the call option premiums
will at least partially offset price
increases in the cash market.
Assvime the case study farmer buys 3
Chicago Board of Trade $2.20 December
1986 call options to establish a ceiling
price on the feed that would have to be
purchased with a poor yield. The
estimated deficit was 1A,500 bushels of
corn and oats. The 3 calls represent
15,000 bushels of com. This implies the
producer has established a ceiling price
on more bushels than the projected
shortfall, but only 500 bushels more.
To purchase the $2.20 December 1986
calls, the producer would currently have
to pay an option premium (at 9 cents per
bushel, that would be $A50 per option)
(Table 3). Assuming a $70 commission per
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contract, the total expense would be
$1,560 for the three calls. Because the
worst scenario for an option buyer is to
have the option expire worthless, the
maximum loss the producer can suffer is
$1,560. The option buyer does not have
to generate capital for margin calls.
If the projected local cash prices
are adjusted for an expected basis, the
December 1986 com futures contract
could be at the following levels for
each yield scenario: bumper yield
($1.85), base yield ($2.15), and poor
yield ($3.43). Because the strike price
of $2.20 is higher than the futures
market price in the bumper and base
yield scenarios, the option would expire
worthless. The producer would suffer a
loss of $1560.
Because the strike price is lower
than the futures contract price in the
poor yield scenario, the call premium
would equal the futures price ($3.43)
minus the call strike price ($2.20) at
expiration. Therefore, the producer
could sell the call option for a premium
equal to at least $1.23 per bushel or
$6,150 per contract. To sell the option
the producer would have to pay
additional commissions of $70 per
contract so revenues after commissions
would be $18,240.
The contribution to overhead with a
poor crop and high prices assxjming
program participation and the purchase
of three call contracts, would increase
to $61,874. That would be a major
improvement in the distribution of
retums under the three scenarios from
the perspective of risk management.
Although the producer experiences lower
retums within the bumper and base yield
scenarios, the livestock producer
receives a major boost in cash flow
during a cost-price squeeze in the
livestock operation. If December futures
market prices stay the same or fall
during the next couple of months before
the spring cind summer weather markets,
this tj^e of feed price insurance may be
very reasonably priced.
Conclusion
The completed analysis clearly
demonstrates that livestock producers or
their lenders should not simply ignore
the farm program. In evaluating
participation in the farm program, each
producer must go through a detailed
analysis of their ovm operation. They
should attempt to do a scenario analysis
as conducted here to gain a perspective
of their returns under different yields
and prices. Since this decision may
represent a multi-thousand dollar
decision, producers would be well
advised to invest money in finding out
what would be the best alternative for
their operation.
Traditional management strategies
must be evaluated with the facts rather
than perceptions. Producers must
evaluate whether the new marketing
strategies, such as call options, can be
incorporated into their risk management
program. Hopefully, this article will
stimulate interest in evaluating
carefully the strategies available.
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